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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
DALE BERKELEY WLISON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DR. MERRILL L. OLDROYD, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
\ 
\ No. 7969 
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
THEREOF 
COMES NOW the defendant and appellant in the above 
entitled case and petitions the Court for a rehearing upon 
the following grounds: 
1. This Court and the jury \V hich tried the case in the 
court belo\v \vere under a misapprehension as to the financial 
\vealth of the defendant. 
2. The Court and the jury have ignored certain evidence 
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of the plaintiff himself going to the nature of the marriage 
relationship of himself and his wife. 
3. The opinion of the court errs in holding that there is 
nothing from which it can be determined that the verdict was 
reached as a result of passion and prejudice. 
4. In holding that the instructions of the Trial Court to 
the jury did not constitute prejudicial error, this Court ignores 
without overruling established cases in this jurisdiction. 
A brief in support of this petition is filed herewith. 
GEORGE W. WORTHEN 
ARNOLD ROYLANCE 
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT ONE 
THIS COURT AND THE JURY WHICH TRIED THE 
CASE IN THE COURT BELOW WERE UNDER A MIS-
APPREHENSION AS TO THE FINANCIAL WEALTH OF 
THE DEFENDANT. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT AND THE JURY HAVE IGNORED CER-
TAIN EVIDENCE OF THE PLAINTIFF HIMSELF GOING 
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TO THE NATURE OF THE MARRIAGE RELATIONSHIP 
OF HIMSELF AND HIS WIFE. 
POINT THREE 
THE OPINION OF THE COURT ERRS IN HOLDING 
THAT THERE IS NOTHING FROM WHICH IT CAN 
BE DETERMINED THAT THE VERDICT WAS REACHED 
AS A RESULT OF PASSION AND PREJUDICE. 
POINT FOUR 
IN HOLDING THAT THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE 
TRIAL COURT TO THE JURY DID NOT CONSTITUTE 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR, THIS COURT IGNORES WITH-
OUT OVERRULING ESTABLISHED CASES IN THIS 
JURISDICTION. 
At the time this case was originally argued, Chief Justice 
Wolfe, who sat during the argument of the case, stated from 
tr~e bench that he was contemplating resignation from the 
Court and requested that the parties consent that in the event 
of such resignation, the case might be determined by a £our-
man court or by a five-man court, including Chief Justice 
Wolfe's successor. Both parties agreed to this proposal. Chief 
Justice \Y/ olfe did not resign from the Court but is still a member 
thereof. Nevertheless, he did not participate in this case. We 
are informed that this v,·as because of the illness of the Justice. 
\\' e are further informed that Chief Justice Wolfe has sub-
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mitted his resignation to become effective late in April and 
so will probably be a member of the Court when this Petition 
for Rehearing is considered. It is therefore requested that 
Chief Justice Wolfe participate in passing upon the Petition 
for Rehearing submitted herewith or if this Petition is not 
considered prior to the effective date of his resignation, that 
his successor participate in considering the same. 
POINT ONE 
THIS COURT AND THE JURY WHICH TRIED THE 
CASE IN THE COURT BELOW WERE UNDER A MIS-
APPREHENSION AS TO THE FINANCIAL WEALTH OF 
THE DEFENDANT. 
In commenting upon Dr. Oldroyd's financial worth, the 
Court in its Opinion stated: ((Dr. Oldroyd is not only a suc-
cessful practitioner, but also has considerable wealth in sheep, 
lands and other properties aggregating to several multiples 
of the judgment rendered against him." The above statement 
is not sustained by the evidence. In their arguments to the 
jury, counsel for the plaintiff spent more time pointing out 
the wealth of the defendant than they did arguing the merits 
of the case. The effect of this on the jury has been obvious 
and even though the jury was instructed by the Court that they 
could consider this matter only in connection with punitive 
damages, it appears that the members of this jury let this 
misconception as to Dr. Oldroyd's wealth affect their delibera-
tions on compensatory damages as well. This Court has also 
misconceived the evidence as did the jury. 
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The evidence as to Dr. Oldroyd's financial status comes 
almost entirely from Dr. Oldroyd's own deposition, which 
was taken on the 15th day of February, 1952, more than nine 
months before the case came to trial. In this deposition, Dr. 
Oldroyd testified that he owned 2700 head of . sheep, worth 
$30.00 per head, and 50 head of cattle on which no value 
was placed. Further comment on the value of these sheep will 
be made later. The doctor further testified that. he owned 
4500 acres of grazing land and had winter and summer graz-
ing permits for },000 head of sheep. No value was placed 
upon the land or upon the grazing permits. ~e further testified 
that he owned $8,000 in Government Bonds; 1,000 shares of 
stock in the Commercial Bank of Utah on which the par 
value was $12.50; 180 acres of pasture ground; $30,000.00 in 
secured loans; $35,000.00 in accounts receivable; two auto-
mobiles; and miscellaneous tools and equipment. 
This Court has held on a number of occasions that it 
can take judicial notice of general economic conditions. The 
Court, therefore, can take judicial notice of what happened 
to the livestock industry generally during the spring months 
c;[ 1952. Wool dropped in price from $1.50 per pound to 
around $.50, which is still the price thereon. The price of sheep 
dropped in proportion, so that sheep worth $30.00 a head 
at the time the deposition was taken were worth only about 
$10.00 per head at the time of the trial, which still represents 
the fair value thereof. No value \vas placed upon the land. 
However, the facts are that much of it was purchased by Dr. 
Oldroyd for $2.00 per acre and would not exceed an average 
value of $5.00 per acre. Grazing pern1its, of course, are Gov-
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ernment permits and while they have a value to the holder, 
rna y not be sold and so do not represent a source of money to 
Dr. Oldroyd. In regard to the $35,000.00 accounts receivable, 
certainly it could not be held that they should be appraised at 
face value. These are accounts receivable which Dr. Oldroyd 
has acquired over his years of practice, many of which are 
barred by the Statute of Limitations and most of which are 
uncollectible. Probably not more thao 10 to 15% of these 
will ever be realized by the Doctor. However, even taking 
them at face value, the financial worth of Dr. Oldroyd at the 
time of the trial stacks up about as follows: 
2700 head of sheep at $10.0Q ____________________ $27,000.00 
50 head of cattle at $100.00 ---------------------- 5,000.00 
4680 acres of land at $5.00 per acre __________ 23,400.00 
Accounts receivable ------------------------------------ 3 5,000.00 
Secured debts ------------------------------------------------ 30,000.00 
Government Bonds -------------------------------------- 8,000.00 
Miscellaneous automobiles, equipment, etc., 
on which a liberal allowance would be____ 4,000.00 
1,000 shares bank stock at $12.50 -.,---------- 12,500.00 
These total approximately $146,000.00, less than twice the 
amount of the judgment rendered in this case rather than 
several times the amount of the judgment as was this court's 
impression. Even taking the sheep and accounts at the full value 
stated in February, the wealth of Dr. Oldroyd would be less 
than $200,000.00. Furthermore, the Court should bear in mind 
in this regard that on a forced sale the defendant will probably 
not be able to realize the fair market value of these assets. 
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Also any of the assets which he sells at a price above the price 
which he paid for them over past years will be subject to 
Federal Income Tax. Likewise, it should be remembered that 
the defendant cannot deduct the amount of this judgment from 
his income tax, and that the plaintiff takes the award income 
tax free. 
It is submitted that if this Court was so tn error as to 
this figure, the jury having no opportunity to review the record 
but having heard the evidence only once orally, would also 
be mistaken in their beliefs in this regard. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT AND THE JURY HAVE IGNORED CER-
TAIN EVIDENCE OF THE PLAINTIFF HIMSELF GOING 
TO THE NATURE OF THE MARRIAGE RELATIONSHIP 
OF HIMSELF AND HIS WIFE. 
In its opinion written in the case, this Court has reviewed 
in great detail the facts in the case in the light most favorable 
to the plaintiff. We agree that this is quite proper and the 
Court on appeal must consider that the jury found the facts 
in favor of the respondents so far as the evidence will permit. 
1-Iowever, in making its statement of facts, the Court overlooks 
certain evidence that came from the plaintiff's own lips touch-
ing the nature of the marriage relationship, which evidence 
neither this Court nor the jury should overlook even finding 
the issues in favor of the plaintiff. Plaintiff admitted that he 
and his wife had discussed getting a divorce long before the 
evidence indicates that she ever knew Dr. Oldroyd (T. 152). 
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Furthermore, the plaintiff admitted that just the summer before 
the affair with Dr. Oldroyd developed he had created a scene 
on a public street when his wife was in company with a Dr. 
Steele, plaintiff accusing his wife and Dr. Steele of improper 
conduct (T. 186). Certainly both of these facts, taken in any 
light, casts considerable doubt on the mutual affection and 
trust between the plaintiff and his wife, yet it is evident that 
the jury in their verdict and this Court in reviewing their 
verdict have overlooked this evidence entirely. 
POINT THREE 
THE OPINION OF THE COURT ERRS IN HOLDING 
THAT THERE IS NOTHING FROM WHICH IT CAN 
BE DETERMINED THAT THE VERDICT WAS REACHED 
AS A RESULT OF PASSION AND PREJUDICE. 
This Court takes cognizance of the fact that the judgment 
in this case is the highest returned in the State of Utah in a 
like case and is among the highest to be found anywhere. 
Counsel has already cited and the Court has taken notice of 
a few cases from other jurisdictions where as high or a higher 
verdict was upheld, but as the Court points out, each case must 
stand upon its own merits and the facts differ greatly in 
vanous cases. 
The only Utah case which we have touching directly upon 
this point is the case of Smith v. Sheffield, 58 Utah 77, 197 
Pac. 605, where a judgn1ent of $25,000.00 against a com-
paratively wealthy man, but under circumstances more aggra-
vated than in this case, was characterized by the Court 
10 
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as Hpalpably excessive." While without question, the value 
of the dollar has greatly declined since the decision in the Shef-
field case, its decline has not exceeded two-thirds in that time. 
Each member of this Court has had extensive experience 
either as a trial judge or as trial counsel with jury verdicts 
in the State of Utah. It is the belief of counsel that each mem-
ber of the Court would have to say that under ordinary cir-
cumstances the verdict in this case, tried before the average 
jury in Utah, "'ould not exceed $15,000.00 at a maximum. 
The plaintiff himself in his testimony placed a maximum 
figure of $15,000.00 on his damages. The following language 
is found at page 190 of the Transcript where the plaintiff is 
testifying regarding a conversation which he had with his 
cousin Lee Nebeker, an attorney, shortly after he came into 
possession of the letter which played so important a part in 
this case: 
((And I had talked to him, I said, tLee, I am not interested 
in this as a lawsuit, I am concerned with my kids, ·and 
Geraldine is going to go her way and I am going mine.' 
And, I said (Ten or fifteen thousand dollars wouldn't 
hurt Doc very much and it would set those kids up 
and insure an education for them, and that would -be 
as far as I would be interested in going.' " 
Where a jury brings back a verdict for damages in an amount 
of 5 times the amount of the dan1ages fixed by the plaintiff, 
on \vhat basis other than a desire to punish the defendant 
resulting from passion and prejudice of the jurors can such a 
judgment be explained? 
\\!bile \ve recognize the fact that what the average jury 
11 
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would do is not controlling upon what this particular Jury 
must do, certainly there comes a point where it must be said 
that a verdict is so far out of line with the value that would 
be reached by the average prudent juror, that it must be held 
from the size of the verdict alone that it was arrived at on 
some other basis than a fair and impartial weighing of values, 
including financial loss, emotional distress and the other factors. 
Indeed in most cases the only evidence that a verdict was 
reached on a basis of passion and prejudice would be the size 
of the verdict alone. It is impossible, of course, to look into 
· the minds of the jurors or to question them upon the basis 
which they reached the verdict. Therefore, unless there is some 
gross error committed at the trial, which in itself would be 
ground for a reversal, there can generally be no evidence other 
than the size of the verdict going to the proposition that it 
was reached on the basis of passion and prejudice. 
This Court held in the case of Wheat v. Denver & Rio 
Grande Western Railroad Co., 250 Pac. (2d) 932, that if a 
verdict is so excessive as to show that it must have been 
motivated by passion and prejudice, that a reduced verdict 
should not be ordered but a new trial granted in its entirety. 
If then, we are to say that before the average prudent jury, 
this verdict would not exceed $15,000.00, must we not as a 
matter of logic say that a jury returning a $75,000.00 verdict 
did not arrive at its verdict on the basis of reason and logic 
but upon the basis of passion and prejudice. Our position on 
this point is borne out by the treatment which the Court makes 
of punitive damages in this case. In considering punitive 
damages, of course, we must consider that portion of the verdict 
12 
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by itself as it is returned upon a different basis entirely than 
is the verdict for compensatory damages. However, as this 
Court held in the case of Evans v. Gaisford, 247 Pac. (2d) 
431, and as it again points out in this case, punitive damages 
standing alone must not be so disproportionate to the injury 
and the actual damage as to plainly manifest that they were 
the result of passion and prejudice. This Court has determined 
that the maximum amount which the jury should have found 
as punitive damage~ in this case was $5,000.00. The jury found 
$25,000.00 or five times the amount that this Court found that 
in reason and logic they could have found. 
Once again referring to the case of Wheat v. Denver & 
Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 250 Pac. (2d) 932, we 
point out that this Court has already held that the size of the 
verdict alone, in the absence of other evidence, may show 
that it was arrived at by passion and prejudice where it is so 
disproportionate to the in jury that no other basis can explain 
the disproportion. 
The question which must now be answered is: How dis-
proportionate to the in jury must the verdict be before it can 
Ge held to have been arrived at by passion and prejudice on 
the basis of the size of the verdict alone? Counsel can find 
nu case in which this Court or any other Court has cut a verdict 
by 80% and still allo\ved the balance to stand. In the case of 
Collins v. Hughes and Riddle, 278 1~orthwestern, 889, the 
jury a\varded $15,000.00 for a spinal injury. The Trial Court 
reduced the verdict to $5,000.00 The Appellate Court held 
that the verdict should not be reduced 66 2/3% and still 
2.llo\ved to stand, but that where such a cut was necessary in 
13 
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order to bring the verdict into line with reason, it should be 
sent back for a new trial entirely. 
qnce again we urge upon the Court that at some point 
of disproportion we must say that by the size of the verdict 
alone that in justice it was reached on the basis of passion 
and prejudice. Is this when the verdict is one hundred times 
what is fair and equitable; when it is ten times what is fair 
and equitable; or, as the Nebraska Court holds, when it is 
three times what is fair and equitable? Certainly, when the 
verdict, as in this case, is five times what is fair and equitable 
under the evidence as this Court has held in regard to the 
punitive damages, it certain! y must be said that it is so dis-
proportionate to the in jury as to indicate that the verdict was 
arrived at on the basis of passion and prejudice. If the punitive 
damages were arrived at on the basis of passion and prejudice, 
could it then logically be said that the compensatory damages 
arrived at by the same jury in the same deliberation on the 
same evidence were in no way affeeted by passion or prejudice. 
In a recent case of Lehman v. Neuman Transit Co., Civil 
No. 97011, Third District Court, decided before Judge Ellett 
and in which case one of the counsel for Dr. Oldroyd was the 
counsel for the plaintiff, the jury returned a verdict of $42,-
000.00 against the defendant for negligently causing the death 
of plaintiff's wife. In that case there was no question of the 
husband himself having contributed to the injury, nor was 
there any question that the wife had been a devoted and loving 
companion and that by her death the husband had suffered 
as much as a husband can suffer by the loss of a wife, yet in 
that case Judge Ellett held that a verdict of $42,000.00 was 
, / 
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excessive and ordered that a new trial be granted unless the 
plaintiff accept a reduction to $25,000.00. 
POINT FOUR 
IN HOLDING THAT THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE 
TRIAL COURT TO THE JURY DID NOT CONSTITUTE 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR, THIS COURT IGNORES WITH-
OUT OVERRULING ESTABLISHED CASES IN THIS 
JURISDICTION. 
Counsel wishes again to urge upon the Court the position 
that the giving of Instruction No. 6 constituted prejudicial 
error. Again "\Ve wish to point out that this instruction is almost 
identical in its language with the instruction for which the 
case of Buckley v. Francis, 6 Pac. (2d) 188, was reversed, the 
minor difference being that in the Buckley case the court 
instructed the jury that the law presumes love and affection 
between a husband and wife, v1hereas in this case the Court 
instructed the jury that the law presumes the possibility of 
a reconciliation between an estranged husband and wife. We 
ag;ee completley with the statement of the court that the fact 
that a husband and v1ife are estranged does not allow a stranger 
t0 interfere with impunity. However, the degree of damages 
is directly related to the possibility or probability of reconcili-
ation just as the degree of damages is directly related to the 
presence or absence of love and affection between a husband 
and \vife. If, in the Buckley case, the jury had found that there 
wa~ no love and affection between the wife and husband, no 
substantial verdict could be returned and therefore it was 
1) 
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held prejudicial error for the court to direct the jury that there 
was a presumption of love and affection where there was 
already evidence in the case where the jury could find without 
resort to a presumption. In this case, if the jury were to find 
from the evidence that there was no possibility for a reconcili-
ation between plaintiff and his wife before the acts of the 
defendant complained of, then there would be no basis upon 
which the jury could have found any substantial damages. 
The defendant had introduced evidence designed to show 
and which, if believed by the jury would show, that there 
was no possibility of such a reconciliation. If the court had 
instructed the jury in effect ~~you shall determine from the 
evidence whether or not there was a possibility of reconcilia-
tion" certainly the law would be properly stated, but the 
court instructed the jury that the law presumes such a possi-
bility. In other words, the instruction was equivalent to saying, 
~~In spite of the evidence to the contrary, you are to consider 
this case on a basis that there \vas a possibility of a reconncili-
ation." Counsel cannot see how it answers this problem to 
say that the jury may not have interpreted the language in 
this fashion. Why would this jury put any different interpre-
tation on this language than did the jury in the Buckley case, and 
yet the court in that case held that the language placed the 
jury in such a position that it would have to weigh a pre-
sumption against the evidence. Here, as in the Buckley case, 
the instruction goes not so much to the fundamental elements 
of the cause of action as to the measure of damages, and cer-
tain! y in this case it is obvious from the size of the verdict 
that the jury must have found that there was a possibility 
of a reconciliation. In doing this, the plaintiff had in favor 
16 
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of his contention no evidence, but only the instruction of 
the court as to a presun1ption. Counsel urges that this instruc-
tion constituted prejudicial error and that the court should 
not speculate upon the interpretation which the jury placed 
upon the words when it is evident that they n1ight well have 
placed an interpretation thereon that would be highly preju-
dicial to the defendant in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Counsel submits that justice requires a rehearing in this 
case. Members of the bar and members of the lay public to 
whom counsel have talked have generally expressed surprise 
and amazement at the size of the judgment as originally 
rendered and as modified by this court. To compel the plaintiff 
to pay the amount of the modified judgment would be an 
injustice of the gravest character. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE W. WORTHEN 
ARNOLD ROYLANCE 
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
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